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I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 
is at best an incomplete vision for increasing consumer protection 
and heightening corporate responsibility.  Despite calls from the 
Obama Administration and the United States Department of the 
                                                          
 *  Associate Professor and Chair of the Project for Law and Business Ethics, 
University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 
The Ohio State University.  I would like to thank Christine Gall, Esq. for her editorial 
comments and encouragement while drafting this essay.  I would also like to thank 
the editorial board of the American University Law Review for inviting me to participate 
at their symposium and to contribute to this symposium issue.  The views set forth in 
this essay are completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any 
employer or client either past or present.   
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
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Treasury for a new foundation for financial regulation in the United 
States,2 Congress’s response failed to satisfy these calls because the 
foundation created by the Dodd-Frank Act is cracked, fragmented, 
and incomplete.  In many regards, the Dodd-Frank Act is simply an 
invitation for regulation based on the myriad of studies that it 
requires to be conducted for purposes of future regulatory action.3  
                                                          
 2. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:  A NEW 
FOUNDATION 2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf (explaining the agenda of the Obama Administration and the 
United States Department of the Treasury for financial regulatory reform and calling 
for “a new foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and 
more effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards 
innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial 
market”). 
 3. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 123, 124 Stat. at 1412 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5333) (requiring a study of the effects of size and complexity of financial 
institutions on capital market efficiency and economic growth); id. § 202(f), at 1449 
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382) (requiring a study of international coordination 
relating to the bankruptcy process for financial companies); id. § 215, at 1518–19 (to 
be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (requiring a study of secured creditor haircuts); id.  
§ 216, at 1519 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (requiring a study of the 
bankruptcy process for financial and nonbank financial institutions); id. § 217, at 
1519–20 (requiring a study of international coordination relating to the bankruptcy 
process for nonbank financial institutions); id. § 415, at 1578 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-18c) (requiring a study of the criteria for accredited investor status and 
eligibility to invest in private funds); id. § 416, at 1579 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 80b-18c) (requiring a study of a self-regulatory organization for private funds); id.  
§ 417 (requiring a study of short selling); id. § 526, at 1591 (to be codified to  
15 U.S.C. § 8205) (requiring a study of the nonadmitted insurance market); id.  
§ 603(b)(1), at 1598–99 (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 1815) (requiring a study of the 
treatment of credit card banks, industrial loan companies, and certain other 
companies under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956); id. § 620, at 1631 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (requiring a study of bank investment activities); id.  
§ 750, at 1748–49 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 25) (requiring a study on oversight of 
the carbon markets); id. § 913, at 1824–30 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) 
(requiring a study regarding the obligations of brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers); id. § 914, at 1830 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (requiring a study 
on enhancing investment adviser examinations); id. § 917, at 1836 (to be codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (requiring a study regarding financial literacy among investors); 
id. § 918, at 1837 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (requiring a study regarding 
mutual fund advertising); id. § 919A, at 1837–38 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
11) (requiring a study of conflicts of interest within the investment industry); id.  
§ 919B, at 1838–39 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10) (requiring a study on 
improved investor access to information regarding investment advisers and broker-
dealers); id. § 919C, at 1839–40 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10) (requiring a study 
on financial planners and the use of financial designations); id. § 929Y, at 1871 (to 
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5) (requiring a study on the extraterritorial 
application of private rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); id. 
§ 929Z (requiring a study on securities litigation); id. § 939C, at 1888 (to be codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (requiring a study on strengthening credit rating agency 
independence); id. § 939D, at 1888 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring a 
study on alternative business models for compensating statistical rating 
organizations); id. § 939E, at 1888–89 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring 
a study regarding creating an independent professional organization for rating 
analysts employed by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations); id.  
§ 939F, at 1889–90 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9) (requiring a study of 
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Worse yet, the Dodd-Frank Act fails to confront the realities of the 
emerging global financial markets by focusing almost exclusively on 
domestic issues, while failing to address new international realities. 
Financial markets are now global, which has created new risks for 
consumers and new loopholes for avoiding corporate responsibility.  
Globalization has occurred for a variety of reasons.  These reasons 
include the development of new strong national economies around 
the world in countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, i.e. the 
“BRIC” nations,4 and a new excitement for transnational financial 
opportunities, as demonstrated by the continued development of the 
European Union.5  Perhaps, the single biggest factor in the 
globalization of financial markets has been the creation and 
                                                          
assigned credit ratings); id. § 946, at 1898 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7) 
(requiring a study of the macroeconomic effects of risk retention requirements 
relating to asset-backed securities); id. § 967, at 1913–14 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 78d-4) (requiring a study relating to organization reform within the SEC); id. § 968, 
at 1914 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-4) (requiring a study relating to the 
“revolving door” between the SEC and private sector financial institutions); id. § 976, 
at 1923–24 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) (requiring a study regarding increased 
disclosure to investors by issuers of municipal securities); id. § 977, at 1924 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o) (requiring a study of the municipal securities markets); 
id. § 989, at 1939–41 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o) (requiring a study of 
proprietary trading by various financial institutions); id. § 989F, at 1947–48 (to be 
codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 11) (requiring a study of person-to-person lending); id.  
§ 989I, at 1948–49 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 5) (requiring a study regarding 
the exemption for smaller issuers from section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002); id. § 1074, at 2067–68 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1) (requiring a 
study on ending the conservatorship of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and reforming the 
housing finance system); id. § 1076, at 2075 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602) 
(requiring a study on reverse mortgage transactions); id. § 1078, at 2076 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602) (requiring a study on credit scores); id. § 1406, at 2142 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601) (requiring a study of shared appreciation 
mortgages); id. § 1446, at 2172 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701) (requiring a study 
on default and foreclosure of home loans); id. § 1476, at 2200–02 (to be codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 2603) (requiring a study on the effectiveness and impact of various 
appraisal methods, valuation models and distributions channels, and on the Home 
Valuation Code of conduct and the Appraisal Subcommittee); id. § 1492, at 2206 (to 
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5219b) (requiring a study on government efforts to combat 
mortgage foreclosure rescue scams and loan modification fraud); id. § 1494, at 2207 
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-25) (requiring a study on the effect of the 
presence of drywall imported from China during the period beginning with 2004 
and ending at the end of 2007 on foreclosures); id. § 1506, at 2222 (to be codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78m-2) (requiring a study of core deposits and brokered deposits). 
 4. See Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom:  An Argument for 
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1581, 1590 (2010) (discussing how the rise of the “BRIC” nations has decreased the 
importance of the United States’ economy in the global market).  
 5. Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers:  How 
the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as the World’s 
Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 116 (2006) (“The Common 
Market project that has created today’s European Union has produced a unified, law-
making jurisdiction comparable in scale and influence to the United States.”). 
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development of the Internet, which has allowed financial markets to 
become interconnected in a manner that was not previously possible.6  
Although the globalization of financial markets creates many new 
opportunities, such globalization also generates systemic risks that 
did not exist before.  Financial institutions and other businesses 
seeking lower levels of regulation can now move from nation to 
nation seeking weaker regulatory standards, producing a race-to-the-
bottom in international financial regulation.7  Moreover, the 
interconnectedness of these markets means that financial crises that 
might have been national or regional events in the past are much 
more likely to become global.8  Although a seamless web of 
regulation for these emerging global markets is likely infeasible, 
increased international coordination and cooperation is needed. 
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law.9  As stated 
in the preamble, Congress promulgated the Act “[t]o promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.”10  In short, Congress drafted the Dodd-Frank Act to be an 
overhaul of the regulation of the United States financial system.11   
Congress promulgated the Dodd-Frank Act partially in response to 
the United States Department of the Treasury’s June 2009 white 
paper report on the financial crisis that began in 2008, Financial 
Regulatory Reform:  A New Foundation.12  In the report, the Obama 
                                                          
 6. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders:  Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global 
Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 86 (2007) (discussing how the rise of the Internet 
has given investors unlimited access to global capital markets). 
 7. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 8 (“As we have witnessed 
during this crisis, financial stress can spread easily and quickly across national 
boundaries.  Yet, regulation is still set largely in a national context.  Without 
consistent supervision and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their 
activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to the bottom and 
intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial system.”). 
 8. See Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 105, 112 (2007) (“An interesting challenge in the regulation of foreign 
investments is the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when things go 
wrong overseas, like the Parmalat scandal on the Asian financial crisis of 1997.”); 
Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 33 (1999) (“Stock market crashes and financial firm failures have 
become international, just like trading markets.”). 
 9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2. 
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Administration, through the Department of the Treasury, laid out its 
five key objectives for financial regulatory reform:   
•Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms 
•Establish comprehensive regulation of financial markets 
•Protect consumers and investors from financial abuse 
•Provide the government with the tools it needs to manage 
financial crises 
•Raise international regulatory standards and improve 
international cooperation13 
All of these objectives are reflected to some degree within the 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Congress’s efforts to raise international regulatory standards and 
improve international cooperation, however, were limited at best.  
Congress did not completely ignore the Obama Administration’s and 
the Department of the Treasury’s calls for reform.  The Department 
of the Treasury’s June 2009 white paper report contained a long list 
of regulatory objectives to raise international regulatory standards 
and improve international cooperation, including goals to: 
•Strengthen the International Capital Framework 
•Improve the Oversight of Global Financial Markets 
•Enhance Supervision of Internationally Active Financial Firms 
•Reform Crisis Prevention and Management Authorities and 
Procedures 
•Strengthen the Financial Stability Board 
•Strengthen Prudential Regulations 
•Expand the Scope of Regulation 
•Introduce Better Compensation Practices 
•Promote Stronger Standards in the Prudential Regulation, Money 
Laundering/Terrorist Financing, and Tax Information 
Exchange Areas 
•Improve Accounting Standards 
•Tighten Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies14 
Many of these goals were addressed at least in part by the Dodd-Frank 
Act.  With that said, the Dodd-Frank Act falls far short of providing 
comprehensive reform relating to international regulatory standards 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 2–4 (stating the United States Department of the Treasury’s five key 
objectives for financial regulatory reform in the wake of the financial crisis that 
began in 2008). 
 14. Id. at 80–88 (stating the United States Department of the Treasury’s 
objectives for raising international regulatory standards and improving international 
cooperation). 
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and improving international cooperation among national financial 
regulators. 
This Article suggests that the Dodd-Frank Act represents an 
incomplete vision for financial regulation because of its failure to 
adequately address the globalization of financial markets.  In fairness 
to Congress, much of the coordination and cooperation that is 
necessary on the international level will have to be fueled by the 
executive branch and the administrative agencies charged with 
regulatory oversight.  With that said, however, the Dodd-Frank Act is 
largely a twentieth century approach to regulating twenty-first century 
financial markets because it fails to adequately address the 
globalization of financial markets that has occurred within the past 
few decades.   
My previous scholarship on financial regulatory reform has focused 
mainly on the need for harmonization and centralization of 
international securities regulation.  In other articles, I have discussed 
the opportunity that the financial crisis that began in 2008 presents 
for reforming international securities law,15 the need for 
harmonization and centralization of international securities 
regulation,16 the need for an evolutionary approach to reforming 
international securities law,17 the United States government’s role in 
the harmonization and centralization of international securities 
regulation,18 and the need for a centralized global securities 
regulator.19 
This Article supplements and extends my previous scholarship in 
three main ways.  First, this Article highlights the failure of the Dodd-
Frank Act to adequately address the new realities of the emerging 
global financial markets.  Second, this Article discusses three specific 
failures and calls attention to the incomplete vision of the Dodd-
Frank Act in terms of the regulation of person-to-person lending, the 
extraterritorial application of United States securities law, and 
coordination amongst national financial regulators.  Third, this 
                                                          
 15. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity:  Reimagining International 
Securities Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010). 
 16. See Eric C. Chaffee, supra note 4.  
 17. See Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame:  An Evolutionary Model for the 
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
587 (2011). 
 18. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation:  The United 
States Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 
(2010). 
 19. See Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities 
Regulation:  A Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange Commission 
(forthcoming). 
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Article advocates for increased cooperation and coordination among 
financial regulators in all areas of financial regulation as a means of 
preventing or lessening any future financial crisis. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows.  Part II 
discusses the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulation of the Internet 
because of the central role that the Internet has played in the 
globalization of financial markets.  Part III examines the Dodd-Frank 
Act and the extraterritorial application of United States financial 
regulation, and Part IV discusses the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
international coordination of financial regulation.  Finally, in Part V, 
this Article concludes that the Dodd-Frank Act is a good beginning 
for regulatory reform but does not embody a comprehensive vision 
for regulating the emerging global financial markets.  Congress must 
act quickly to fill in the missing pieces of financial regulatory reform 
before another crisis ensues.   
II. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 
The ubiquity of the Internet in financial transactions and in the 
globalization of financial markets is beyond peradventure.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act, however, does little to address this reality.  Within 
the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Internet is 
mentioned only a few dozen times.  The two obvious responses to this 
criticism are (1) that existing regulation allows for the proper 
regulation of the Internet and (2) that many of the provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act implicitly extend to online financial activities.  The 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for 
example, has demonstrated little concern about broadening its reach 
to cover securities transactions occurring online, even in the absence 
of an edict from Congress to do so.20 
Coupled with existing regulation, the Dodd-Frank Act, however, 
does not embody a comprehensive vision for regulating financial 
activity on the Internet.  Congress concedes the limitations of the Act 
in section 989F in which it commissions the Comptroller General of 
the United States and the United States Government Accountability 
Office to conduct a study regarding person-to-person lending to 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to 
Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services 
Offshore, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7516, 63 Fed. Reg. 14806 (Mar. 27, 1998) 
(vowing to take action “whenever [the SEC] believe[s] that fraudulent or 
manipulative Internet activities have originated in the United States or placed U.S. 
investors at risk”). 
CHAFFEE.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  7:03 PM 
1438 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1431 
determine what sort of regulatory structure should be imposed upon 
it.21 
Person-to-person lending, which is also referred to as “person-to-
person investing,” “peer-to-peer lending,” “peer-to-peer investing,” 
and “lending 2.0,” refers to any online system of matching individual 
lenders with individual borrowers.22  Person-to-person lending shares 
characteristics with Internet auction sites such as eBay in the sense 
that the purpose of person-to-person lending is to connect 
individuals to facilitate financial transactions.23  Person-to-person 
lending also shares characteristics with Internet dating sites such as 
match.com in the sense that both are designed to bring individuals 
together for the purpose of creating a relationship.24  Person-to-
person lending is a small, but growing, segment of the lending 
industry.25 
In section 989F, Congress expressly mandates, “[t]he Comptroller 
General of the United States shall conduct a study of person to 
person lending to determine the optimal Federal regulatory 
structure.”26  Section 989F requires the Comptroller General to 
consult a wide variety of parties in formulating its response to person-
to-person lending, including “Federal banking agencies, the [United 
States Securities and Exchange] Commission, consumer groups, 
outside experts, and the person to person lending industry.”27  In 
regard to the content of the study, the Act states the following: 
The study required . . . shall include an examination of— 
                                                          
 21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1947–48 (2010) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 11) 
(requiring that the Comptroller General of the United States and the United States 
Government Accountability Office “determine the optimal Federal regulatory 
structure” for person-to-person lending). 
 22. See Ron Lieber, The Gamble of Lending Peer to Peer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011,  
at B1 (explaining that person-to-person lending connects individual lenders with 
individual borrowers via the Internet). 
 23. See Who We Are, EBAY INC., http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Apr. 3, 
2011) (describing the online marketplace site as a way to connect individual buyers 
and sellers). 
 24. See About Match.com Dating, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/ 
help/aboutus.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) (outlining the process of matching 
single individuals through online profiles with photos and member information). 
 25. See Alex Brill, Peer-to-Peer Lending:  Innovative Access to Credit and the 
Consequences of Dodd-Frank, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (Dec. 3, 2010), at 1, 
available at http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication_detail.asp?id=2215 
(reporting that the financial crisis and resulting credit crunch, along with a record 
number of bank failures, have boosted the budding peer-to-peer lending industry, a 
“rapidly expanding financial services product . . . that competes directly with 
traditional bank lines of credit and credit cards”). 
 26. Dodd-Frank Act § 989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1947 (2010) (to be codified at  
5 U.S.C. app. 11). 
 27. Id. § 989F(a)(2). 
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 (A) the regulatory structure as it exists on the date of 
enactment of this Act, as determined by the [United States 
Securities and Exchange] Commission, with particular 
attention to— 
 (i) the application of the Securities Act of 1933 to person to 
person lending platforms; 
  (ii) the posting of consumer loan information on the 
EDGAR database of the Commission; and 
  (iii) the treatment of privately held person to person 
lending platforms as public companies; 
 (B) the State and other Federal regulators responsible for the 
oversight and regulation of person to person lending markets; 
 (C) any Federal, State, or local government or private studies of 
person to person lending completed or in progress on the date 
of enactment of this Act; 
 (D) consumer privacy and data protections, minimum credit 
standards, anti-money laundering and risk management in the 
regulatory structure as it exists on the date of enactment of this 
Act, and whether additional or alternative safeguards are 
needed; and 
 (E) the uses of person to person lending.28 
In addition to determining the “optimal Federal regulatory structure” 
for regulating person-to-person lending,29 the goal of the Comptroller 
General’s and the Government Accountability Office’s study is to 
generate a report containing “alternative regulatory options . . . 
[and] recommendations on whether the alternative approaches 
[would be] effective.”30  Section 989F mandates that the report must 
be submitted no later than one year after the enactment date of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.31 
Improving the regulatory structure for person-to-person lending is 
necessary because, despite the benefits of person-to-person lending, it 
also poses substantial risks.  As a result of the ubiquity of the Internet, 
the sources of these risks can be both domestic and abroad.   
The benefits of person-to-person lending are substantial.  This type 
of lending makes more credit available, which helps to generate 
economic growth.32  Moreover, this type of lending provides credit to 
                                                          
 28. Id. § 989F(a)(3). 
 29. Id. § 989F(a)(1). 
 30. Id. § 989F(b)(2). 
 31. Id. § 989F(b)(1). 
 32. See Brad Stone, Lending Alternative Hits Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at B1 
(reporting that peer-to-peer lending originated as an alternative source of funding at 
a time when more traditional lending sources were shunning dependable borrowers 
and increasing interest rates). 
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populations who are traditionally underserved by the consumer 
credit industry.33  This allows capital to flow into economically 
depressed communities, providing new opportunities for community 
development and economic growth.34 
At the same time, the risks of person-to-person lending are also 
substantial.  The underserved populations to which person-to-person 
lending provides credit are traditionally comprised of individuals who 
are poor credit risks.35  Person-to-person lending continues to be 
marred by high borrower default rates and large lender losses.36  This 
reality generates concerns that lenders are making inaccurate risk 
assessments about their exposure to loss created by person-to-person 
lending.37  Additionally, high borrower default rates also generate 
concerns about effective punishment of delinquent loans and 
overzealous actions by lenders against borrowers in default.38  
Moreover, person-to-person lending has taken all of the concerns of 
traditional lending and moved them from the “brick and mortar” 
world of traditional lending regulation into cyberspace.39  These 
concerns include investment fraud, identity theft, consumer privacy 
and data protection, securities fraud, money laundering, and 
terrorism financing.40 
                                                          
 33. See generally Aleksandra Todorova, Peer-to-Peer Lending Offers Solution for 
Strapped Consumers, SMART MONEY, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.smartmoney.com/ 
spending/deals/peer-to-peer-lending-offers-solution-for-strapped-consumers-21978/ 
(explaining that the recent economic crisis has forced homeowners, small business 
owners, and credit card users to seek financing from non-traditional lending sources, 
including person-to-person lending). 
 34. See id. (reporting that positive stories have emerged from the rise of person-
to-person lending, in which individuals who once were mired in payday loans have 
been able to pay off their debt and raise their credit scores).  
 35. See Alan B. Krueger, In Credit Crisis, Some Turn to Online Peers for Cash, N.Y. 
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Oct. 14, 2008, 9:17 AM), 
 http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-credit-crisis-some-turn-to-
online-peers-for-cash/?scp=7&sq=peer-to-peer+lending&st=nyt (noting that person-
to-person lending sites tend to attract high-risk borrowers who cannot obtain credit 
from more traditional lending sources, such as banks). 
 36. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 22, at B1 (noting that more than one-third of 
loans on the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper.com were in default and the average 
investor lost 4.95 percent annually). 
 37. See generally Brill, supra note 25 (explaining that rapid growth in peer-to-peer 
lending has given rise to concerns about its regulation, spurring the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Congress to exercise oversight). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Ian J. Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community 
Development Finance 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper 2009-06, 2009), 
available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2009/wp2009-
06.pdf (providing a survey of diverse models for peer-to-peer lending in the United 
States and explaining specific risks). 
 40. See id. at 11 (explaining various concerns created by person-to-person 
lending). 
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Remarkably, despite the myriad of risks generated by person-to-
person lending, regulation of it has largely fallen on the SEC.  The 
SEC has taken an interest in person-to-person lending because of the 
involvement of securities in one of the common models for such 
lending.41  Under this model, a bank serves as an intermediary in a 
person-to-person lending transaction by issuing a loan to an 
individual borrower.42  The loan is then sold as a note to the 
individual lender with a return that is dependent on repayment of 
the loan by the individual borrower.43  The note qualifies as a security 
under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 193344 and section 
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,45 which provide the 
definition of a security for purposes of federal securities law.  
Specifically, under these definitional sections, the note in the person-
to-person lending transaction qualifies as a security because it is both 
an investment contract under the test developed by the Supreme 
                                                          
 41. See generally Carl E. Smith, If It’s Not Broken, Don’t Fix It:  The SEC’s Regulation of 
Peer-to-Peer Lending, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 21 (Fall/Winter 2009–2010) (discussing the SEC’s 
regulation of person-to-person lending in the United States). 
 42. See id. at 21–22 (explaining the person-to-person lending models of Prosper 
Marketplace, Inc. and LendingClub Corporation, two major person-to-person 
lending platforms that have operated in the United States). 
 43. Id.  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2011) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, 
treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, 
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating 
to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
‘security’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing.”). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2011) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, 
treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral 
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest 
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in 
general, any instrument commonly known as a ‘security’; or any certificate of interest 
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include 
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a 
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of 
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.”). 
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Court of the United States in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.46 and a note 
under the “family resemblance” test developed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Reves v. Ernst & Young.47  Because the notes 
issued in this model of person-to-person lending constitute securities, 
they are subject to the registration, antifraud, and other provisions of 
the federal securities laws. 
As a result, the SEC has taken a relatively active role in regulating 
person-to-person lending.  On November 24, 2008, the SEC issued a 
cease-and-desist order against Prosper Marketplace, Inc., the 
Delaware corporation based in San Francisco that owns and operates 
the person-to-person lending website www.prosper.com.48  The SEC 
asserted that Prosper had violated sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, which prohibit the sale of unregistered 
securities, by selling notes to individual lenders that were generated 
from loans by banks to individual borrowers.49  In response to the 
SEC’s order, Prosper Marketplace, Inc. now must register the notes 
that it sells as part of its person-to-person lending activities.50 
Relying on the SEC alone, however, to regulate person-to-person 
lending will not create a sufficient level of regulation.  This type of 
lending implicates a plethora of areas of the law, including lending 
regulation, securities regulation, consumer privacy and data 
protection, anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism controls, and 
fraud prevention.  Many of these areas of law are beyond the scope of 
the SEC’s expertise and regulatory authority.  Achieving a proper 
level of regulation of person-to-person lending is as complex as, if not 
more complex than, achieving a proper level of regulation of 
traditional lending.   
Congress needs to develop a comprehensive regulatory scheme for 
person-to-person lending.  This type of lending creates significant 
risks for lenders, borrowers, and society unless it is adequately 
regulated.  The study and report mandated by section 989F of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is a step in the right direction.  Section 989F, 
however, also reveals that the Dodd-Frank Act does not embody a 
fully formed vision of regulation for financial activities occurring on 
                                                          
 46. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (holding that the test for an investment contract, 
which is a specific type of security for purposes of federal securities law, is “whether 
the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to 
come solely from the efforts of others”). 
 47. 494 U.S. 56, 65–67 (1990) (providing the test for a note, which is a specific 
type of security for purposes of a federal securities law). 
 48. Prosper Marketplace, Securities Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL 4978684 
(Nov. 24, 2008) (cease-and-desist order). 
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. at 6. 
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the Internet.  This incomplete vision creates risks from threats 
domestic and abroad to the United States financial system. 
Congress should work quickly to create a comprehensive system of 
regulation for person-to-person lending and to ensure that the 
United States system of financial regulation adequately addresses the 
risks created by the Internet.  In regulating person-to-person lending, 
Congress should take an approach similar to regulating traditional 
lending including adopting policies that promote full and fair 
disclosure and regulations that protect lenders and borrowers.  
Moreover, Congress must address the special concerns created by 
using the Internet to facilitate person-to-person lending, e.g., the 
heightened risk of fraud, the dangers of identity theft, and the 
possibility that such lending will be used for terrorism financing.  
Because of the ubiquity of the Internet, Congress must work quickly 
to stave off threats both domestic and abroad. 
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
OF UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REGULATION 
The United States has traditionally maintained a high quality 
system of financial regulation.  The globalization of financial markets, 
however, has fueled a ratcheting down of the level of regulation and 
enforcement in the United States in an attempt to maintain the 
competiveness of its national financial markets.  The United States 
Department of the Treasury in its June 2009 white paper report 
stated the following in regard to the phenomenon: 
As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread 
easily and quickly across national boundaries.  Yet, regulation is still 
set largely in a national context.  Without consistent supervision 
and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their 
activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to 
the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global 
financial system.51 
Put simply, unless steps are taken to end the race-to-the-bottom that is 
occurring in financial regulation, additional and more intense 
financial crises will occur. 
The extraterritorial application of United States financial 
regulation offers one means of combating the race-to-the-bottom that 
is occurring because of the globalization of financial markets.  The 
race-to-the-bottom is the result of regulators competing to make their 
particular jurisdiction appear more attractive to financial institutions 
                                                          
 51. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 8. 
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by lowering the level of financial regulation.  If United States 
financial regulation is applied extraterritorially, this helps to set a 
floor of regulation in foreign jurisdictions because foreign regulators 
may be able to ratchet down their own systems of financial regulation, 
but they cannot ratchet down the system of the United States.  This is 
not to claim that the United States can and should reach every 
financial transaction and financial matter around the globe.  
However, broad extraterritorial application of United States 
regulation can help to serve as a check against a race-to-the-bottom. 
Remarkably, Congress opted to address the extraterritorial 
application of federal financial regulation in only two provisions of 
the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Act.52  Two possible reasons 
for this may be (1) that existing regulation already allows for 
extensive extraterritorial application of United States financial 
regulation and (2) that many of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
may implicitly extend the extraterritorial reach of United States 
financial regulation.  Considering the Obama Administration’s and 
the United States Department of the Treasury’s calls for 
comprehensive international financial regulatory reform,53 however, 
this limited emphasis on the extraterritorial application of United 
States financial regulation is surprising to say the least.  
The two provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that do deal with the 
extraterritorial application of United States financial regulation 
demonstrate that the Dodd-Frank Act does not embody a 
comprehensive vision for financial regulatory reform.  These 
provisions focus only on the extraterritorial application of federal 
securities regulation and provide an incomplete vision for that area 
of financial regulation because one of the provisions is a mandate for 
additional study.54 
                                                          
 52. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47) 
(2010) (strengthening the enforcement powers of the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission by clarifying the extraterritorial reach of their jurisdiction); 
id. § 929Y, at 1871 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5) (mandating a study on the 
extraterritorial application of private rights of action under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934). 
 53. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 2 (“We must build a new 
foundation for financial regulation and supervision that is simpler and more 
effectively enforced, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation 
and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial market.”). 
 54. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P, 124 Stat. at 1862–65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 80a-47) (clarifying the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission to enforce the federal securities laws); id. § 929Y, at 1871 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5) (mandating a study regarding the 
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
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Section 929P does strengthen and clarify the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s power to extraterritorially 
enforce the United States securities laws.  Specifically, section 
929P(b)(1) modifies section 22 of the Securities Act of 193355 by 
adding the following new subsection:   
(c) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts of 
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory 
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or 
instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a 
violation of section 17(a) involving— 
 (1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities 
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only 
foreign investors; or 
 (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.56 
Similarly, section 929P(b)(2) modifies section 27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193457 by adding the following new subsection: 
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts 
of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory 
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or 
instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a 
violation of the antifraud provisions of this title involving— 
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities 
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only 
foreign investors; or 
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.58 
Finally, section 929P(b)(3) modifies section 214 of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 194059 by adding the following new subsection: 
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts 
of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory 
shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or 
instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a 
violation of section 206 involving— 
                                                          
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000). 
 56. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(1), 124. Stat. at 1864 (to be codified as 15 U.S.C.  
§ 77v(a)) (modifying § 22 of the Securities Act of 1933). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000). 
 58. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1865 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 78aa) (modifying § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2000). 
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(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the violation is 
committed by a foreign adviser and involves only foreign 
investors; or 
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.60 
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act is a positive step in addressing 
the new systemic risk created by the globalization of financial markets 
because it strengthens the SEC’s role in regulating those markets.  
However, it stands as the lone provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that 
clarifies the extraterritorial application of the United States system of 
financial regulation. 
Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the SEC solicit 
public comment and conduct a study regarding extending the 
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.61  Specifically, Congress charged the 
SEC with studying whether private rights of action should be 
extended to “conduct within the United States that constitutes a 
significant step in the furtherance of the violation, even if the 
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves 
only foreign investors” and “conduct occurring outside the United 
States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United 
States.”62  In conducting its study, the SEC was charged with 
considering the following: 
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it 
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more 
limited to extend just to institutional investors or otherwise; 
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on 
international comity; 
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of 
action for transnational securities frauds; and 
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be 
adopted.63 
The report based on the study is due no later than eighteen months 
after the enactment of the statute.64 
Congress’s approach to the extraterritorial application of federal 
securities law is, in a certain regard, laudable.  The provisions of the 
                                                          
 60. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1865 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 80(b)-14) (modifying § 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). 
 61. Id. § 929Y(a), at 1871 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 929Y(b). 
 64. Id. § 929Y(c).  
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Dodd-Frank Act demonstrate Congress taking a cautious approach to 
reforming the extraterritorial application of federal securities law.  
Such an approach is warranted because of shifting judicial 
interpretations of the provisions governing the extraterritorial 
application of federal securities law at the time of the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
The Supreme Court of the United States decided Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd.65 on June 24, 2010, roughly a month prior 
to President Barack Obama signing the Dodd-Frank Act into law.66  In 
Morrison, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of the 
extraterritorial application of federal securities regulation and held 
that a general presumption exists against the extraterritorial 
application of federal securities law.67  In that case, during February 
1998, National Australia Bank Limited (National), an Australian Bank 
whose “ordinary shares” were not traded on any exchange in the 
United States, acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a 
mortgage servicing company headquartered in Florida.68  From 
February 1998 until mid-2001, National’s annual reports, public 
documents, and other public statements asserted that HomeSide was 
operating successfully.69  However, on July 5, 2001, National 
announced that it was writing down HomeSide’s assets by $450 
million and on September 3, 2001, National announced that it was 
writing down HomeSide’s assets by an additional $1.75 billion.70  
Russell Leslie Owen, Brian Silverlock, and Geraldine Silverlock (the 
Plaintiffs), all of whom are Australian, sought to represent a class of 
foreign purchasers of National’s ordinary shares that were sold 
outside of the United States in an action brought in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York against National, 
HomeSide, and the officers of both companies (the Defendants).71  
The Plaintiffs alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.72  The Southern 
District of New York granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss based 
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction because the acts in the United States were 
                                                          
 65. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2879 (rearticulating the principle that cases arising under federal law, 
including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, carry a 
presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 68. Id. at 2875 (recounting the underlying facts of the case). 
 69.  Id. 
 70. Id. at 2875–76. 
 71.  Id. at 2876. 
 72.  Id. 
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arguably only steps in a fraud that occurred abroad.73  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on similar 
grounds.74 
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinions of both the lower 
courts.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the Court’s 
analysis by stating that the issue should be decided as a motion to 
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim, rather than a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), 
because the issue in the case was whether the Plaintiffs could state a 
claim under which relief could be granted.75  The Court went on to 
hold that a presumption exists against extraterritorial application of 
the federal securities laws, unless a “clear indication” of such 
application is stated in the particular statute.76  The Court rebuked 
the Second Circuit and courts in other circuits for their case law 
departing from his presumption.77  Justice Scalia wrote, “Rather than 
guess anew in each case we apply the presumption in all cases, 
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate 
with predictable effects.”78  The Court also clarified that “the focus of 
the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception 
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States.”79 
The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act show Congress struggling 
with the Court’s holding in Morrision and responding to the Court’s 
call for Congress to legislate.  In section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Congress clarifies the scope of the SEC’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
by adopting a conduct and effects approach,80 and in section 929Y, 
Congress demonstrates a willingness to consider extending 
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by mandating a study of the issue by 
the SEC.81  Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act reflects Congress’s willingness 
                                                          
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 2876–77. 
 76. Id. at 2878. 
 77.  Id. at 2878–80. 
 78.  Id. at 2881. 
 78.  Id. at 2884. 
 80. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864–65 (to be codified at 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“strengthening and clarifying the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s power to extraterritorially enforce the United 
States securities laws”).  
 81. Id. § 929Y(a), at 1871 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d) (requiring that the 
SEC solicit public comment and conduct a study regarding extending the 
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). 
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to allow broader extraterritorial application of United States 
securities regulation in the face of the Court’s holding limiting such 
extraterritorial application.  
Congress’s failure to focus on the extraterritorial application of 
other sorts of financial regulation, however, is remarkable.  At 
minimum, Congress should have required a study of the 
extraterritorial application of United States financial regulation in 
general, rather than just requiring a discrete study on extraterritorial 
application of the private rights of action under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  With the globalization of financial markets, 
Congress should have taken a more aggressive approach to the 
extraterritorial application of financial regulation as a means of 
policing those financial markets and reducing system risk.   
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
The internationalization of financial markets creates the need for 
greater coordination and cooperation among financial regulators.  
The Obama Administration, through the United States Department 
of the Treasury’s June 2009 white paper report, acknowledged the 
need for greater coordination and cooperation by making one of its 
five key objectives for financial regulatory reform the raising of 
international regulatory standards and improvement of international 
cooperation.82  Congress’s response in the Dodd-Frank Act does show 
some promise, but it remains weaker than necessary to properly 
regulate the emerging global financial markets. 
Section 175 of the Dodd-Frank Act governs international policy 
coordination.  Specifically, section 175(a) of the Act allows the 
President or the President’s designees to “coordinate through all 
available international policy channels, similar policies as those found 
in United States law relating to limiting the scope, nature, size, scale, 
concentration, and interconnectedness of financial companies, in 
order to protect financial stability and the global economy.”83  Section 
175(b) of the Act requires the Chairperson of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to “regularly consult with the financial regulatory 
entities and other appropriate organizations of foreign governments 
                                                          
 82. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 2, at 2–4 (listing “[r]aise 
international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation” as the 
Obama Administration’s and United States Department of the Treasury’s “five key 
objectives” for financial regulatory reform). 
 83. Dodd-Frank Act § 175(a), 124 Stat. at 1442 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.  
§ 5373). 
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or international organizations on matters relating to systemic risk to 
the international financial system.”84  Finally, section 175(c) requires 
that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Secretary of the Treasury “consult with their foreign counterparts and 
through appropriate multilateral organizations to encourage 
comprehensive and robust prudential supervision and regulation for 
all highly leveraged and interconnected financial companies.”85  
Although the mandates of section 175 are vague, Congress’s 
acknowledgement of the need for international coordination is 
admirable. 
Moreover, section 112(a)(2)(D) of the Act expressly charges the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council with a duty “to monitor 
domestic and international financial regulatory proposals and 
developments, including insurance and accounting issues, and to 
advise Congress and make recommendations in such areas that will 
enhance the integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the 
U.S. financial markets.”86  Assuming that this mandate is met, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council should prove a valuable 
resource for monitoring international regulatory proposals and 
developments, which may potentially lead to greater coordination 
among United States financial regulators and foreign financial 
regulators.  
The Dodd-Frank Act, however, fails to embody a fully formed vision 
of international coordination of financial regulation as demonstrated 
by the studies it requires for purposes of future regulation.  Notably, 
section 202(f) of the Act requires that “[t]he Comptroller General of 
the United States shall conduct a study regarding international 
coordination relating to the orderly liquidation of financial 
companies under the Bankruptcy Code.”87  In regard to the 
bankruptcy process, the Comptroller General is specifically charged 
with evaluating the following: 
(i) the extent to which international coordination currently exists; 
(ii) current mechanisms and structures for facilitating 
international cooperation; 
(iii) barriers to effective international coordination; and 
(iv) ways to increase and make more effective international 
coordination.88 
                                                          
 84. Id. § 175(b). 
 85. Id. § 175(c). 
 86. Id. § 112(a)(2)(D), at 1395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322). 
 87. Id. § 202(f), at 1449 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382). 
 88. Id. § 202(f)(1)(B). 
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The report based on the study is due no later than one year after the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.89  Section 217 of the Act requires 
that a substantially similar study be conducted for nonbank financial 
institutions by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.90 
Congress’s lack of a coherent vision for the bankruptcy of 
transnational financial institutions, which is evidenced by the studies 
required in section 202(f) and section 217 of the Act, is disturbing for 
two reasons.  First, it demonstrates that the Dodd-Frank Act does not 
embody a comprehensive vision for regulating the emerging global 
financial markets.  Second, it evidences that Congress has likely failed 
to meet one of its stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act, i.e., to put 
an end to financial institutions that are “too big to fail,” because these 
institutions are likely to exist transnationally, and the Act does not 
embody an orderly plan for transnational reorganization or 
dissolution. 
In addition to Congress’s lack of a coherent vision for the 
bankruptcy of transnational financial institutions, Congress’s efforts 
in the Dodd-Frank Act are inadequate to ensure a proper level of 
regulation of the emerging global capital markets.  The Dodd-Frank 
Act contains a few provisions requiring coordination among 
regulators regarding securities-related issues.  For example, section 
752 requires the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the prudential regulators 
to  
consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the 
establishment of consistent international standards with respect to 
the regulation (including fees) of swaps, security-based swaps, swap 
entities, and security-based swap entities and may agree to such 
information-sharing arrangements as may be deemed to be 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors, swap counterparties, and security-based swap 
counterparties.91 
The Dodd-Frank Act, however, by no means contains a 
comprehensive vision for regulating the emerging global capital 
markets. 
A new vision is needed for international cooperation and 
coordination among securities regulators because, within the past few 
                                                          
 89. Id. § 202(f)(2). 
 90. See id. § 217, at 1519–20 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394) (requiring a 
study of international coordination  regarding the bankruptcy process for nonbank 
financial institutions). 
 91. Id. § 752(a), at 1749–50 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8325). 
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decades, capital markets have transformed from being national or 
regional in nature to being global.92  Many of the reasons for the 
globalization of capital markets are the same or similar to the reasons 
for the globalization of financial markets in general, e.g., the 
development of new strong economies around the world in countries 
such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and a new excitement for 
transnational financial opportunities, as demonstrated by the 
continued development of the European Union.93  Moreover, the 
Internet and other forms of communication have helped sew 
together the world’s capital markets in a way that has not previously 
been possible.94 
The globalization of capital markets also has occurred for a variety 
of other reasons.  Issuers now look beyond the borders of their home 
countries for opportunities to raise capital,95 and many retail and 
institutional investors search for investment opportunities worldwide 
as a means of portfolio diversification and to offset currency 
                                                          
 92. See Greene, supra note 6, at 85 (contending that there is “no argument that 
the securities markets are now global” and that the SEC must take action because 
other securities markets and regulators are as sophisticated as the United States and 
“the dominance of the United States as the leading player in the global marketplace 
is being challenged”). 
 93. See DeLaMater, supra note 5, at 117 (noting that not only have non-U.S. 
securities markets “grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past twenty 
years and now afford issuers in their home countries significant opportunities for 
financing that did not previously exist” but that European markets have become 
viable alternatives to U.S. markets because they are more receptive to equity offerings 
and longer-term debt offerings than they were in the past). 
 94. See Greene, supra note 6, at 86 (reporting that the Internet provides investors 
with “almost limitless information,” which, along with increasingly sophisticated 
investors and the need for financial diversification outside of the United States, has 
fueled a growing desire to interact directly with non-U.S. market participants); Susan 
Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on A Blueprint from Cross-Border Access to U.S. 
Investors:  A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69, 69–70 (2007) 
(characterizing globalization as “a fact,” citing (1) technologies that are creating 
more efficient trading across the globe, (2) capital market participants who are 
expanding their activities into foreign markets, and (3) investors who are searching 
for international investment opportunities); George W. Madison & Stewart P. 
Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors:  
A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 99 (2007) (“The rapid pace 
of technological advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global 
capital market.  In such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity, 
greater diversification, and a wider range of investment options regardless of their 
location.”); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to 
U.S. Investors:  A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 33 (2007) (stating 
that technological advances have contributed to the possibility of having a “truly 
global capital market” by reducing “structural barriers” to global trade in services and 
goods). 
 95. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1692, 1711 (2008) (explaining that the SEC cannot assume that the U.S. markets will 
continue to be the leading capital markets, as “U.S. investors are buying foreign 
securities in record numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make 
offerings in the U.S. to raise capital”). 
CHAFFEE.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  7:03 PM 
2011] DODD-FRANK ACT:  A FAILED VISION 1453 
fluctuations.96  Additionally, the transformation of many securities 
exchanges into for-profit institutions as a result of demutualization 
has caused those exchanges to eschew previous nationalistic and 
protectionist tendencies in favor of searching for profit-making 
opportunities globally.97  Demutualization has created a wave of 
exchange consolidation.98  On April 4, 2007, the merger between the 
New York Stock Exchange and Euronext gave birth to the world’s 
first global stock exchange,99 and the ensuing push for consolidation 
continues to fuel globalization.100 
The globalization of capital markets creates new systemic risks.  In 
the absence of a harmonized and centralized system of monitoring, 
regulation, and enforcement, concerns linger about a race-to-the-
bottom in international securities law as national and regional 
regulators ratchet down their securities laws in an attempt to attract 
                                                          
 96. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition,  
3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 195 (2008) (detailing the world’s most recent wealth gains, 
which have occurred in areas like the Middle East, Russia, India, and China, and 
concluding that “[a]s global markets improve, U.S. investors, both institutional and 
retail, have expanded their geographic reach so as to be almost as willing and able to 
trade in those markets as in New York”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 94, at 31 
(“Investors now search beyond their own borders for investment opportunities and, 
unlike the past, many of these investors are not large companies, financial firms, or 
extremely wealthy individuals.”). 
 97. See Jenah, supra note 94, at 71 (reporting that the conversion of securities 
exchanges into for-profit entities has “unleashed pressure from shareholders to 
increase profits through expansion, investment in new technology, and cost cutting, 
forcing these for-profit entities to eschew nationalistic or protectionist tendencies in 
the bid for value maximization”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York 
Stock Exchange:  The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
355, 356 (2007) (“Another factor in the inevitable globalization of exchanges is that 
the exchanges have demutualized and become public companies.  They need to 
please their shareholders as well as their customers.”). 
 98. See Eric J. Pan, A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets,  
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 136 (2007) (reporting that Euronext joined 
together exchanges in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris and that OMX joined 
exchanges in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Iceland, Riga, Stockholm, Tallinn, and Vilnius). 
 99. See generally Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International 
Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 152 (2007) (discussing 
exchange demutualization, international regulatory standards (“or lack thereof”) 
between the United States and the European Union, and “international regulatory 
coordination as illustrated by the merger between NYSE and Euronext”); Sara M. 
Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly Transnational Exchange?,  
33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008) (examining the New York Stock Exchange and 
Euronext merger in detail and calling for additional harmonization between the 
United States and the European Union securities regulatory agencies). 
 100. See Jenah, supra note 94, at 71 (“This chess game of proposed exchange 
mergers, capital tie-ups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears 
witness to the truism that capital markets are global.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 
94, at 31 (“Today, mergers and talks of mergers among the world’s stock exchanges 
make obvious what financial professionals have long known:  capital markets are 
global.  Greater investor wealth and education have created the demand for such 
markets, and technology, in particular, has made globalized markets feasible.”).   
See generally supra note 99 (detailing the merger between the NYSE and Euronext).  
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issuers, investors, and other market participants to their 
jurisdictions.101  Moreover, the existing fragmented system of 
regulation creates concerns about regulatory and enforcement gaps 
and various collective action problems in determining which 
regulators should address particular issues.102 
The vague mandates of sections 175 and 112 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act offer little to no guidance as to the United States’ role in 
regulating the emerging global capital markets.  Ideally, regulators 
from around the globe should join together to create a harmonized 
and centralized system of securities law that would provide a seamless 
web of monitoring, regulation, and enforcement.103  However, this 
type of cooperation is unrealistic in the short-term.104  At minimum, 
Congress should have provided some guidance as to the United 
States’ role in regulating the emerging global capital markets.  The 
United States does participate in transnational organizations such as 
the International Organization of Securities of Commissions 
(IOSCO), which do provide some coordination among national and 
regional securities regulators.105  The United States, however, has 
traditionally been a leader in the area of securities regulation, and 
                                                          
 101. See also Langevoort, supra note 96, at 193 (arguing that the financial crisis that 
began in 2008 demonstrates “that other countries have been too lax as well, so that 
there should be a ratcheting up of securities regulation not only in the United States, 
but worldwide”). 
 102. See Karmel, supra note 8, at 39 (acknowledging that because many securities 
violations are transnational, national laws need to be given extraterritorial effect; 
however, if those laws are given extraterritorial effect, that would create “conflict 
between regulators and confusion on the part of regulated persons as to what are the 
proper rules”); Langevoort, supra note 96, at 204 (articulating the “classic free rider 
problem” that  “[w]hen trading is heavily fragmented, no nation is able to capture 
enough of the benefits from investments in quality regulation”); Tafara & Peterson, 
supra note 94, at 32 (explaining that the current regulatory gaps in foreign markets 
present risks to U.S. investors that do not exist in United States markets). 
 103. See supra notes 15–19 (arguing in favor of the creation of a harmonized and 
centralized system of international securities regulation). 
 104. See Langevoort, supra note 96, at 205 (arguing that a global securities and 
financial services regulator will not come into being any time soon, “[e]ven in the 
face of crisis and scandal,” until countries take “small steps” toward coordinating 
enforcement efforts and the idea of a permanent regulatory institution becomes less 
politically threatening”).  But see Karmel, supra note 8, at 40 (“Securities regulators 
do not have a long history of mutual cooperation and the coordination of 
investigative activities that bank regulators have long enjoyed.  Nevertheless, many 
securities regulators now have exchanged Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) 
and cooperate extensively with regard to their investigative activities.”). 
 105. See IOSCO Historical Background, OICV-IOSCO 
 http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (last visited Mar. 28, 
2011) (“[IOSCO’s] membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities 
markets and it is the primary international cooperative forum for securities market 
regulatory agencies.  IOSCO members are drawn from, and regulate, over 100 
jurisdictions and its membership continues to grow.”). 
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Congress’s lack of vision in the Dodd-Frank Act regarding 
international securities regulation is remarkable to say the least. 
The Dodd-Frank Act fails to embody a fully formed vision of 
international coordination of financial regulation, especially in 
regard to international bankruptcy law and international securities 
regulation.  Congress may have touted the Dodd-Frank Act as 
comprehensive regulatory reform, but it should really be viewed as 
just a beginning.  Congress must act quickly to provide greater 
coordination and cooperation among the world’s financial regulators 
in regard to international bankruptcy law and international securities 
regulation.  Moreover, Congress must implement a regulatory regime 
that encourages coordination and cooperation among the world’s 
financial regulators in general. 
V. THE NEED FOR A NEW VISION FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM 
Financial markets are now global, which has created new risks for 
consumers and new loopholes for avoiding corporate responsibility.106  
As evidenced by the crisis that began in 2008, the globalization of 
financial markets has yielded new systemic risks and weaknesses.107  
Despite the globalization of markets, financial regulation remains set 
largely in the national context.  The globalization of financial 
markets has resulted in regulatory and enforcement gaps, collective 
action problems, and market inefficiencies.108   
 Despite calls by the Obama Administration and the United States 
Department of the Treasury for a new foundation for financial 
regulation,109 the foundation created by the Dodd-Frank Act is 
cracked, fragmented, and incomplete.  Congress has failed to deliver 
a comprehensive vision for regulatory reform within the voluminous 
body of the Dodd-Frank Act.  This incomplete vision for financial 
regulatory reform is evidenced by the myriad of studies required to 
be conducted for purposes of future regulation110 and Congress’s 
                                                          
 106.  See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (discussing the globalization of 
financial markets). 
 107.  See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (analyzing the risks created by the 
globalization of financial markets. 
 108.  See supra notes 101–02 (discussing the issues created by the globalization of 
capital markets). 
 109.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text (detailing the Obama 
Administration’s and the United States Department of the Treasury’s objectives for 
raising international regulatory standards and improving international cooperation). 
 110.  See supra note 3 (listing the numerous studies that Congress mandated under 
the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
CHAFFEE.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  7:03 PM 
1456 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1431 
lackluster efforts to raise international regulatory standards and 
improve international cooperation.111 
 As highlighted in this article, the Dodd-Frank Act does not embody 
a comprehensive vision for international financial regulatory reform.  
First, the Dodd-Frank Act contains little to address the role of the 
Internet in financial transactions and in the globalization of financial 
markets.112  Congress’s lack of regulatory vision for person-to-person 
lending is especially troubling because this type of lending remains 
largely unregulated and presents all of the risks of traditional 
lending.113  Second, the Dodd-Frank Act contains little to address the 
extraterritorial application of United States financial regulation.114  
Congress does clarify the jurisdiction of the SEC in enforcing federal 
securities law.115  However, Congress studies only the potential 
exterritorial application of private rights of action under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,116 and it ignores the extraterritorial 
application of United States financial regulation in a plethora of 
other contexts.  Third, the Dodd-Frank Act does not provide for 
sufficient coordination of international financial regulation.117  
Although the Dodd-Frank Act supplies general mandates about 
coordination among financial regulators,118 the lack of a fully formed 
vision for international coordination and cooperation in regard to 
                                                          
 111.  See supra Parts II–IV (detailing the shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
regard to the regulation of the Internet, the extraterritorial application of United 
States financial regulation, and international coordination of regulation). 
 112.  See supra Part II (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and regulation of the 
Internet). 
 113.  See supra Part II (discussing the study of person-to-person lending mandated 
by § 989F of the Dodd-Frank Act and the failure of Congress to provide any 
additional guidance or indication as to how person-to-person lending should be 
regulated). 
 114.  See supra Part III (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and the extraterritorial 
application of United States financial regulation). 
 115.  See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text (detailing Congress’s 
clarification in § 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act of the SEC’s power to extraterritorially 
enforce the United States securities laws).  
 116.  See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (noting Congress’s mandate 
under § 929Y that the SEC solicit public comment and conduct a study regarding 
extending the extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the 
Securities Act of 1934). 
 117.  See supra Part IV (analyzing the Dodd-Frank Act and international 
coordination of financial regulation). 
 118. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (discussing § 175, which 
governs international policy coordination); supra note 86 and accompanying text 
(noting that § 112(a)(2)(D) of the Dodd-Frank Act charges the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council with a duty to monitor international financial proposal and 
developments). 
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international bankruptcy law119 and international securities regulation 
is troubling to say the least.120 
 Although the Dodd-Frank Act represents a good first step in 
financial regulatory reform, Congress must acknowledge that it is 
only a first step and work to address the numerous issues that are left 
open by the Dodd-Frank Act.  Congress’s focus should be to create a 
comprehensive system of financial regulation that focuses on 
coordination and cooperation in the international realm.  In the 
wake of the Great Depression in the 1930s, coordination and 
cooperation on the national level ushered in an era of relative 
financial stability in the United States that lasted for the remainder of 
the twentieth century.121  Because of the globalization of financial 
markets that has occurred in the past few decades, coordination and 
cooperation must become the norm on the international level in the 
wake of the Great Recession that began in 2008.  Congress must 
supply a new vision for international financial regulatory reform to 
supplant the incomplete vision embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
                                                          
 119. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the 
Dodd-Frank Act for failing to provide a fully formed vision of international 
coordination relating to international bankruptcies). 
 120. See supra notes 91–105 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the 
Dodd-Frank Act to provide a proper level of regulation for the emerging global 
capital markets). 
 121.  See, Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:  The Continued Validity of 
the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009) 
(discussing the creation of a harmonized and centralized system of securities regulation in the 
United States in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression); 
see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip:  Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2006) 
(noting that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “represent the 
first major federal attempts at securities regulation”). 
